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THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES*
W. M. HENDREN

"What, sir," asked Horace Binney, "is the Supreme Court of the
United States ?" "It is the august representative of the wisdom and
justice and conscience of this whole people, in the exposition of their
constitution and laws. It is the peaceful and venerable arbitrator
between the citizens in all questions touching the extent and sway
of Constitutional power. It is the great moral substitute for force
in controversies between the People, the States and the Union."
"In not one serious study of American political life," said Theodore Roosevelt, at a dinner of the Bar in honor of Judge Harlan in
1902, "will it be possible to omit the immense part played by the
Supreme Court in the creation . . . of the great policies, through
and by means of which the country has moved on to her present
position. .. "
To Harold J, Laski, "the Supreme Court of the United States
is not merely a tribunal where the controversies of men are resolved;
it is also a legislature in which the life of a Nation is given form and
color."
In the opinion of the Washington News, the Supreme Court has
"become a super-congress. It is much more than a court passing on
legal technicalities. It is a policy-forming and law-making body,
which is not representative of, nor responsible to the people."
Domination of Legal Thinking
The opening paragraphs of the preface to "The Business of the
Supreme Court" takes cognizance of the extraordinary degree to
which the United States is subject to the domination of legal thinking. It is there pointed out that "Every act of government, every
law passed by Congress, every treaty ratified by the Senate, every
executive order issued by the President, is tested by legal considerations, and may be subjected to the hazards of litigation.
"Other nations, too, have a written constitution. But no other
country in the world leaves to the Judiciary the powers which it
exercises over us. The little village of Euclid, Ohio, enacts a zoning
* An address delivered to the Law School, University of North Carolina,
on April 4, 1930. Mr. Hendren is a member of the North Carolina Bar, Winston-Salem, N. C.
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ordinance; the Supreme Court has to pass upon it. The United
States makes a treaty with Germany concluding the Great War; not
until the Supreme Court has spoken in a case nominally between
two individuals do we know the limits and meaning of the treaty."
When a question of judicial reform arises in Great Britain, a
commission explores the situation, having as its guide what wisdom
and experience suggests. But with us there is yet another consideration: Can we do it under our constitutional system?
And thus it is that "most of the problems of modern society,
whether of industry, agriculture or finance, or racial interaction, or
the eternal conflict between liberty and authority, are sooner or later
legal problems for solution by our courts, and, ultimately, by the
Supreme Court of the United States."
PoliticalSignificance of Coiut
The essential political significance of that Court's share in the
operation of the Union can hardly be overestimated. "Of this truth
the history of the Federal Judiciary system brings a striking proof.
Under Marshall's guidance the Supreme Court was one of the chief
promoters of the Federalist philosophy. The exercise of the powers
entrusted to the Judiciary by Congress profoundly influence the balance of forces in the unabated contest between States and National
government, as well as in the conflict between divergent economic
interests."
The story of these momentous political and economic issues lies
concealed in the opinions and orders of the court, "the dry bones of
very vital social, political and economic contests."
The Syllogism
The syllogism plays a minor part in the formulation of the rules
by which men are governed. "General propositi6ns," observed Mr.
Justice Holmes in the course of his dissent in Lochner v. New York,
198 U. S. 45, 74, "do not decide concrete cases. The decision will
depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate
major premise." For instance to again use the language of Justice
Holmes, "The felt necessities of the times, the prevailing moral and
political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious,
even the prejudices which judges share with their fellowmen. .. "
A study of the passionate devotion to states' rights with its counterpart of opposition to the Federal Judiciary, whether North or
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South, will reveal that it is based not so much on dogmatic, political
theories and beliefs, as upon the particular economic, political or
social question involved.
To Washington, the Supreme Court "must be considered as the
keystone of our political fabric," and so we are not surprised to find
the Chief Justice must be not only a great lawyer, a great statesman,
a great executive, but as well a great administrator and leader.
Many eminent names were presented to him in connection with
the appointment of the first Chief Justice. On April 21, 1789, James
Wilson wrote to Washington: "I commit myself to your Excellency
without reserve and inform you that my aim rises to the important
office of Chief Justice of the United States." Arthur Lee, in a letter
of May 31, 1789, applied to Washington for appointment as one of
the justices: "It is," writes Lee, "not without apprehension of presuming too much on the favor you have always shown me that I
offer you my services as a Judge of the Supreme Court which is
establishing."
Washington was unable to comply with these requests, but John
Rutledge was more successful. In a letter of June 12, 1795, we find
him writing to Washington: "Finding that Mr. Jay is elected Governor of New York and presuming that he will accept the office, I
take the liberty of intimating to you privately that, if he shall, I have
no objection to take the place which he holds. .. ."
In tendering the appointment of the first Chief Justiceship to
John Jay, Washington writes: "It is with singular pleasure that I
address you as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States for which office your commission is enclosed." John Jay was
commissioned, "Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States." Charles Evans Hughes is commissioned "Chief Justice of
the United States." Rutledge, Ellsworth, Marshall, Taney, Chase
and Waite were commissioned under the title "Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States." Fuller was commissioned as
"Chief Justice of the United States." The Constitution mentions
the office only once: In Article -One, Section Three, relative to impeachments in which it is provided--"When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside." The first
official use of the term "Chief Justice of the United States" occurs
in the Act of July 13, 1866. However, in other acts and as late as
the Act of March 3, 1911, the reference is to "The Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States."
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It is a far-cry from February 1, 1790-the day of the organization of the Court in the Royal Exchange at the foot of Broad
Street, New York-to February 24, 1930-the day Charles Evans
Hughes, in the Capitol at Washington, took his seat as the Eleventh
Chief Justice of the United States.
In 1790 the Judges were attired in "party-colored" robes, maybe
of black and red, while in 1930 we see them garbed in somber black.
Contrasting the elegance of these robes with the solemn black of
today, an incident in the career of Mark Twain is recalled. When
he went up to Oxford to receive the degree of Doctor of Literature,
he attended dinner at one of the colleges where, through mistaken
information, he wore black evening dress when he should have worn
his scarlet gown. "When I arrived," Clemens tells us, "the place
was just a conflagration-a kind of human prairie fire. I looked as
out of place as a Presbyterian in hell."
The commission of Mr. Justice Hughes recites: "With the advice
and consent of the Senate." The question put by the Vice-President
was "Shall the Senate advise and consent to the nomination ?" And
upon the announcement of the result-yeas 52, nays 26, the record
shows: "The Senate advises and consents to the nomination of
Charles Evans Hughes to be Chief Justice of the United States."
There was, in truth, no "advice" not even an opportunity to advise,
since the resignation of Mr. Taft and the appointment of Mr.
Hughes were, to all intents and purposes, simultaneous, and the
"consent" was only after a manner of speaking.
The opposition to Mr. Hughes was put upon two grounds: That
he had resigned from the Court to be a candidate for President and
that his economic views were in accord with those who in business
and industry occupy the seats of the mighty. The objection based
on his economic views was given- emphasis and point by c decision
of the Supreme Court handed down in the Baltimore Street Car
Fare case on January 6, 1930, where the Court had before it the task
of fixing the value of property of the Street Car Company for the
purposes of determining its rate of fare. It is an interesting and
informative circumstance that the use made of the decision in this
case by the opposing Senators was, in the main, beside the mark,
being based upon a misconception of what was actually decided.
In reality the Baltimore Street Car case is not particularly pertinent. It was seized upon in the Senate to adorn a tale with a cur-
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rent event. Back of this case and its result was the consciousness of
the constantly growing tendency of the Court to hold legislation
invalid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The statistics I am about to give you are
taken from an article by Mr. Ray A. Brown in 42 HarvardLaw Review 866. From 1868 to 1912, the Court held against the legislation
in a fraction more than six per cent of such cases; from 1913 to
1920, in a bit more than seven per cent of such cases; while from
1920 to 1926, the percentage increased to twenty-eight. Looked at
from the standpoint of the votes of the individual judges in each
case, the percentage up to 1921 was ninety favorable, while from
1921 to 1926, the adverse vote had grown to thirty-one per cent.
As emphasizing the "Persuasive evidence of the part that the personal
element plays. . . ." Mr. Brown compares the vote of the different
members of the Court in a certain class of cases. Mr. Justice Brewer,
in twenty-one years of service on the bench, participated in 46 cases
involving the conflict between individual rights and the police power.
In 19 of these cases, or approximately forty-one per cent, he held
legislation unconstitutional because of illegal infringement upon individual interests. Mr. Justice Peckham's record is similar. Out of
41- police power cases he denied validity to the statutes in 16 instances, an average of thirty-nine per cent. The contrast is striking
between the record of these two judges and that of Mr. Justice
Holmes, who, during more than a quarter of century of service on the
bench, has participated in nearly all the important cases of the kind
to which reference is being made. Fulfilling his declared principle
of judicial deference to the legislative will, he has sustained legislation in 190 of the 212 cases which he has considered, an average
of disallowance of only ten per cent. Mr. Justice MacReynolds and
Mr. Justice Brandeis came upon the bench at nearly the same time.
Mr. Justice MacReynolds has refused his sanction to legislation in
thirty per cent of the cases in which his vote is of record. Mr. justice Brandeis in less than fifteen per cent.
In legislation involving the interest of particular classes the
prejudices and sympathies of the Judges are still more apparent. In
the cases concerning legislation intended to better the condition of
labor the votes of those Justices above mentioned shows this remarkable divergence: Brewer, sustaining legislation, 3, rejecting legislation 6; Peckham, sustaining 3, rejecting 6; Holmes, sustaining 4,
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rejecting 1; MacReynolds, sustaining 15, rejecting 12; Brandeis,
sustaining 18, rejecting, none.
This record of Mr. Justice Brandeis calls to mind the fierce
and unrelenting fight made upon his confirmation when he was appointed in 1916 by President Wilson. The class, which to the objecting Senators, was responsible for the selection of Mr. Hughes
were the leaders in the fight against Mr. Brandeis. The basis of
their objection in a large part was with respect to his economic views,
that he was liberal, if not radical. I have often wondered just what,
if anything, passed between Mr. Justice Brandeis and Chief Justice
Taft after he came on the bench, because it is of record that Chief
Justice Taft, along with other outstanding lawyers of the United
States, joined in a written protest against the selection and confirmation of Mr. Brandeis. Mr. Justice Brandeis is not, in truth, as
he was painted in this contest, and no more is Mr. Justice Hughes.
It can be safely said that one is a liberal and the other conservative,
each sincere in his views.
The opposition to Mr. Hughes and the opposition to Mr. Brandeis is but confirmation of Mr. Madison's notion that economics lies
at the base of law. We find him saying in the Federalist:
"Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever
formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors and
those who are debtors follow under a like discrimination. A landed
interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, with many
lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide
themselves into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and
views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests
forms the principal task of the modern legislation."
And he could very well have added "and of the courts, especially the
Supreme Court of the United States."
The significance and far-reaching consequences of the economicviews of the Judge and the importance and dignity of the position of
the Chief Justice of the United States were noted in the speech of
Mr. Borah who opened the debate in opposition to the confirmation
of Mr. Hughes. From that speech I take two excerpts:
"In many respects the Chief Justiceship of the United States Supreme Court is far more important than is the Presidency of the
United States. The influence which Marshall exerted, the influence
which Taney exerted upon this Government and the powers of government far exceed any influence which has ever been exerted by any-
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President in that particular regard. It is no ordinary matter to place
a man in the Chief Justiceship of the Supreme Court of the United
States, a court which with its wide sweep of jurisdiction encompasses
almost every question which can be of concern to the people of the
United States."
"We are entering upon an era when the greatest undecided question before us is that of determining the relationship of these vast
corporate interests to the millions of people in the United States who
must pay them toll year by year. Could there be any more profound
question, touching the interest of every man, woman, and child in
the United States for years and years to come, than the question of
how much the oil people, power people, the gas people, the transportation people, and all others dealing with those questions shall
charge the people of the United States for their commodities and
services? The decision which Mr. Marshall rendered in the McCulloch case affected for all time the governmental questions of the
United States; but the question of what shall be the relationship of
our people to those who have gathered up our natural resources and
who are in control of the means by which we reach the natural resources of the United States, when it is finally determined will affect
more directly, more pointedly the whole people of the United States
than any other decision that has ever been rendered by the Supreme
Court of the United States."
Senator Glass based his objection to Mr. Hughes, "on his lack of
sensibility." "In theory and in expectation," said the Senator, "a
person appointed and confirmed to the highest court in this land should
serve for his lifetime, or until he is himself convinced that he has
reached that point of service and that age in life when he finds himself disqualified for the position. That is why the Supreme Court
judges have life tenure, and it has always seemed to me an exhibition
of the severest indifference to that theory and that consideration for
any justice of the Supreme Court of the United States to contemplate for a momeni discarding the ermine and coming down from his
exalted station to participate selfishly in the turmoils and disputes
of partisan politics. I believe this whole country felt a shock, as
it was grievously distressed when Mr. Justice Hughes resigned his
place on the Supreme Court bench to be a candidate for President
of the United States."
To Senator Dill, "the views of Mr. Hughes on economic questions are just as important as his legal ability."
To an editorial writer of the Baltimore Sun economic views take
precedence over legal competence. Elaborating this conception that
editorial proceeds:
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"There are those who argue that the practice of the law is by its
nature such that its devotees are merely expert pleaders, to make
the best possible case for the side by which they are retained, and that
they are so subtly geared that when elevated to the bench their past
partisanship fades entirely out of their memory. That may be true,
so far as the law is concerned, but the United States Supreme Court,
by its own will, has moved its "activities into the larger orbit of determining social and economic policies, and then imparting to them
the force of law. It has, in other words, brought itself to the place
where legal competence is only one-and perhaps not the most important-test of fitness for service in that court. This accounts for
the strange phenomenon taking place in the Senate, where the fitness
of an admittedly great lawyer for what the copybooks say is the
greatest legal post in the Nation is being debated, and rightly, as an
economic and social issue."
Undoubtedly, the opposition to Mr. Hughes in the Senate which
started in a perfunctory and feeble way and gained very considerable
momentum "is one of the most significant developments in the
political life of this Nation for many years."
The Washington News so viewed it:
"Hughes is the outstanding example of a jurist who advocates private
corporate interests at the expense of the public interest. To persons
still holding to the myth that a justice's private opinions are of no
consequence in this connection because his job is merely to pass as
an expert upon technicalities of the law, the Senate opposition to
Hughes may seem unjust and beside the point. But, in fact, the
court in major cases has long since become a policy-forming body.
When social and economic issues are involved, the justices tend to
vote their personal opinions as do members of Congress in passing
laws. . . . The curious and dangerous aspect of this long development of Supreme Court supremacy as a virtual lawmaking body is
that it has occurred without public awareness."
"We have lost the early American independence which held no
political institution above the critical judgment of sovereign citizens.
. . . The Senate debate on the Hughes nomination is significant
because it breaks through this hush-hush and ah-ah atmosphere surrounding the court, daring to examine that political and very human
institution for what it is worth."
It is quite apparent that the writer of this editorial was not
familiar with the Lincoln day address of Mr. Justice Brewer, in
which is found this paragraph:
"'It is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored
or helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism. On the contrary,
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the life and character of its Justices should be the objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments subject to the fiercest
criticism. The time is past in the history of the world when any
living man or body of men can be set on a pedestal and decorated
with a halo. True, criticisms may be like their authors, devoid of
good taste, but better all sorts of criticism than no criticism at all.
The moving waters are full of life and health; only in the still
waters is stagnation and death."
There has been no loss of "early American independence which
held no political institution above the critical judgment of sovereign
citizens." What has happened is what always happens; that during
periods of prosperity the voice of criticism is not heard; it has not
disappeared, it has merely been submerged beneath the strident voice
that worships at the shrine of Things.
In a sense there is nothing new about the issue which was being
debated. Senator Vandenberg pointed out:
"It is the same attack upon a system of divided powers of government that we have had in the United States for 140 years. . . .It
is simply a new form of an old phenomenon. The Government was
only ten years old when objection to certain branches of the Federal
judiciary on the part of the political authorities then in control of
the Government resulted at that early date in reprisals, in an effort
to repeal the laws that established the circuit courts of the United
States. This was simply the beginning of a continuous, serial effort
to force the judgment of the legislature upon the judiciary and to
break the judiciary upon the wheel of Congress. Persistently it
has come to hazardous expression in the efforts to take from the
Supreme Court the right to pass upon the constitutionality of the
Acts of Congress."
Undoubtedly, some of the Senators, and with them some of the
newspapers agree, would like "to force the judgment of the legislature upon the judiciary and to break the judiciary upon the wheel
of Congress." Beyond the shadow of a doubt, there is a body of
opinion in the Senate and outside the Senate which has for its goal
"to take from the Supreme Court the right to pass upon the constitutionality of the acts of Congress."
For all such I invoke, in a political sense, the penalty that came
into existence in Rome in the fifth century as a deterrent upon the
overwhelming flood of "new laws." Gibbons tells us that the evangels of the "new" had created a condition "more intolerable than the
vices of the city," to correct which it was necessary to declare that
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he who proposed a new law should stand "forth in the assembly of
the people with a cord around his neck, and if the new law was rejected, the innovator was instantly strangled."
But the Senate debate cannot be thus dismissed. It has a deeper
and more permanent meaning, a significance apart from froth and
fool notions. There lies at the base of the provision for the "advice
and consent" of the Senate upon judicial appointments a reason,
which present day conditions have in no degree lessened, but rather
emphasized. The judicial process, especially now, is such that more
is involved than character and legal lore and training. When one of
the important subjects of litigation deals with what tolls the people
shall pay in the course of the activities of everyday life, the people
have an interest in the selection of the judge and it is only through the
Senate that they may be heard, and when protection is needed, receive it. Quite apart from one's agreement or disagreement with
the Senate opposition to Mr. Hughes, the open-minded man cannot
escape the significance and outreach of that opposition.
It is in keeping with, it is a part of the "social mindedness" of
the twentieth century. On the political side it is evidenced by the
action of the Board of Directors of the Anti-Saloon League, ratified
by its national convention in January last. From an outline of its
future policy I quote:
"'More than ever before the object of the Anti-Saloon League and
that of every social welfare agency requires the same type of men
in public life, and the same open, frank representations as to the
qualifications of those seeking public office. Very definitely in this
day the line is being drawn between those candidates for positions of
public trusts who are social minded and those who represent selfish
interests seeking special privilege. Consequently, more than ever
before, we must give attention to the question of social mindedness
in the weighing of records and attitudes of political candidates."
This attitude of the public mind was by the Senate very definitely
carried over into the judicial field and sought to be applied to the
selection of Judges of the Supreme Court. Its meaning is that legal
thought and popular thought need and must have closer companionship; that the people have come to know that the chambers of the Supreme Court are not vacuum chambers; that judges are not anointed
high priests, but are men with like passions and prejudices with them.
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Mr. Hughes is the eleventh in line of succession. It is the second
time that a justice of the Supreme Court, who resigned to accept or
bid for another office, was thereafter appointed Chief Justice. Mr.
Rutledge, after service as an Associate Justice, and resignation to
accept the Chief Justiceship of the Supreme Court of his State, was
offered the position of Chief Justice of the United States, and served
for about six months. But when his nomination came before theSenate he was not confirmed, the ostensible reason was his mental
condition. The real reason was a speech in opposition to the Jay
Treaty. While the fact of Rutledge leaving the Supreme Court
bench to accept another office may not have had any direct bearing,
it is hard to escape the conclusion that it was in mind, for the prevailing opinion was that once a Supreme Court Judge always that
and nothing else.
Timothy Pickering wrote, in connection with the Independence
of the Judiciary, on May 19, 1828:
"Perhaps it might be expedient to render this as perfect as any
human institution can be, to declare, an amendment to the Constitution that a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States should
be forever precluded from every other office and placed under thegeneral government; either by the appointment of the Executive,.
from Congress, or the election of the people."
The rejection of Rutledge supplies us with one of the "ifs" of
history. And a tremendous "if" it is. But for his speech in opposition to the Jay Treaty, he would undoubtedly have been confirmed,
and as his death did not occur until the year 1800, the Chief Justice-ship, if held by him, would have become vacant at a time when it
is extremely unlikely that President Adams would have appointed'
John Marshall as his successor. Thus, upon the event of one chance
speech regarding a British Treaty, hinged the future course of'
American constitutional law.
If it be true that "whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver
to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or
spoke them," then the Chief Justice of the United States is the chief'
"law-giver" of present day Christendom, for he is the presiding and
responsible genius of the highest judicial tribunal of the foremost
and most powerful nation of the .world. In his court lies the power
to set at naught the expressed legislative will of more than one hun-.
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dred and twenty million people, and to say what they shall pay for
gas, electric current, what they shall pay to ride on street cars and
steam cars, and what it will cost them to have their goods and chattels hauled, and maybe whether Mr. Henderson may continue to
"cuss" the chain stores.
The Supreme Court of the United States occupies a unique position in the political science of the world; in fact, it is our chief
-original contribution to the science of government. The Constitution of the United States and the Supreme Court of the United
.States are at the base of government in America. The supremacy
of the nation is established by the second clause of Article Six of the
Constitution. After all this is but a declaration. It must be capable
of enforcement. Without the means of enforcement the purposes of
the Founding Fathers would be left unfulfilled. And so the next step
was the establishment of a'tribunal having the power of enforcing
throughout the Nation and the States the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws "made in pursuance thereof." The work of the
framers was brought to completion with the adoption of Sections
one and two of Article Three, in part reading:
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."
As originally conceived, the mission of the court was "to confine
the Federal authority to its legitimate field of operation and to control State aggression on the Federal domain." The complex character of the Government of the United States, part National and
part Federal, demanded such an organ of government; the Constitution was in need of "a living voice."
The Court's essential role is to mediate between conflicting public
'policies in American life. In the beginnings these policies were governmental, dealing with quesfions of the relative and respective pow.ers of the United States and a State, in the common territory. In
the growth and development of the country the function of the court
.as a mediator has been enlarged. Much of its attention is now given
to conflicting economic theories and practices. This shift in direction
.and power is revealed in a striking way in the senatorial debate upon
.the confirmation of Mr. Hughes.
Senator Connaly emphasized the change:
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"In the early history of this country the contests in the Congress
and on the hustings and in the courts were contests relating to the
form of our political institutions-they were questions of power and
of constitutional construction. Most of these great questions have
been settled either by decisions at the ballot box or of the Supreme
Court. But the questions which are going to affect vitally the people
of the United States in the years to come are not questions of great
political systems, are not questions of State's rights, or slavery. The
great questions that now confront us are economic questions ....
"
And now after 140 years, how does it stand with our affection
for the court? Conceding that the court is neither "infallible nor
invincible," let us read the words of DeTocqueville, written in 1835,
and ask ourselves if they are not yet true:
"The Supreme Court is placed at the head of all known tribunals,
both by the nature of its rights and the class of the justiciable parties
which it controls. The peace, the prosperity and the very existence
of the Union are placed in the hands of the Judges. Without their
active coperation the Constitution would be -- dead letter; the
executive appeals to them for protection against the encroachment
of the legislative powers; the legislature demands their protection
against the designs of the executive; they defend the Union against
the disobedience of the States; the States from the exaggerated claims
of the Union; the public interests against the interests of private citizens, and the conservative spirit of order against the innovations of'
an excited democracy."
With William Wirt I say:
"The people of the United States know the value of this institution
too well to suffer it to be put down or trammelled in its actions by
the dictates of others,"
and so I give you a toast in the words of 1801"The Judiciary of the United States-independent of party, independent of power, and independent of popularity. .. ."
For you to whom I speak is the next campaign of the law. It
"looks to your youth and strength to improve it as good husbandmen. Remember that you are servants of the commonwealth and
are devoted, not to a trade, but to a science. . . . Remember that it
is your office as lawyers to give authentic form to the highest public
morality of which you are capable as citizens, and that this office belongs of right, no less to the bar than to the bench."
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"And what a profusion it is! . .. No doubt every calling is
great when greatly pursued. But what other gives such scope to
realize the spontaneous energy of one's soul? In what other does
one plunge so deep in the stream of life-to share its passions, its
battles, its despair, its triumphs, both as witness and as actor ?"
The influence of the lawyer has not increased in proportion to the
power of the people. It was the opinion of DeTocqueville thaf under
that condition a republic could not "subsist."

